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IF CAP AND TRADE IS THE ANSWER,
SOMEBODY IS ASKING THE WRONG QUESTION:
AN EVALUATION OF CAP AND TRADE
IN THE NORTH DAKOTA CONTEXT
TONY CLARK*

ABSTRACT
Cap and trade has emerged as one of the most discussed public policy
mechanisms for reducing the emission of carbon into the atmosphere. It is
a top priority of the Obama Administration and is favored by many in
Congress. Cap and trade was a keystone of the controversial “American
Clean Energy and Security Act” passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in the summer of 2009. Unfortunately, it is a policy that seems
ill-suited to meeting its proposed goal. Mounting evidence suggests it does
not accomplish very well, or at least very efficiently, its goal to “protect the
environment.” It does not provide the price certainty needed for proper
future planning of our nation’s energy resources. It is sufficiently unlike
past cap and trade schemes so as to suggest any past success would not be
indicative of successful implementation in the carbon context. And while
its inherent flaws thwart its stated goals, its implementation would be
harmful to the nation’s economy, generally, and disproportionately to North
Dakota’s, specifically. Putting aside the scientific debate about anthropogenic global climate change, the international nature of carbon as an
emissions source calls for a much different approach to the issue at hand. A
more prudent approach to reducing carbon would involve heavy reliance in
research and development of new sources of energy, with much less
emphasis on “placing a price on carbon.” This would ensure that nations
around the world would do what is best for both their own economic selfinterest, as well as their own long-term environmental interest.

*North Dakota Public Service Commissioner, elected in 2000. Before his election, he was
North Dakota’s Labor Commissioner, serving in the cabinet of former Governor Ed Schafer.
Commissioner Clark is a former state legislator, representing District 44 (Fargo, North Dakota) in
the North Dakota State House from 1994-97. He holds bachelor’s degrees from North Dakota
State University and a master’s degree in public administration from the University of North
Dakota.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Among the most discussed items on the federal government’s agenda
since the November 2008 elections has been the prospect of a national
framework for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The approach
for addressing GHG reductions that has emerged with the greatest support
within the present Congressional majority and the Obama Administration is
known as “cap and trade.” This article seeks to explain the basic construct
of cap and trade, with a special emphasis on the factors driving the policy
and its policy implications for the State of North Dakota. Given the widespread flaws of cap and trade, generally, and its harmful effect on North
Dakota, specifically, it is not surprising the proposal has garnered so little
support within the Peace Garden State.1

II. WHAT IS CAP AND TRADE?
A November 2008 report released by the National Regulatory Research
Institute (NRRI) explains cap and trade as working in three steps:
(1) An overall cap on emissions is defined for a set of entities. In a
cap and trade program for GHGs, the cap will most likely be

1. See Margo Thorning & Pinar Cebi, Cap & Trade and North Dakota’s Economic Future,
N.D. POL’Y COUNCIL, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.accf.org/publications/129/cap-tradeand-north-dakotas-economic-future (describing how the proposed cap and trade system would
negatively impact North Dakota).
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defined in terms of CO2 equivalents. The set of entities could be
as limited as those in the electric generation sector, or as broad as
all fossil fuel users plus major emitters of other GHGs like
methane.
(2) The right to emit the quantity of emissions defined by the cap
is translated into emissions allowances. The unit of allowances in
a GHG cap and trade is likely to be one metric ton of CO2. Depending on choices in program design, the responsible government
agency allocates allowances to specified entities at no cost, sells
the allowances to the affected entities or to other parties, or does a
combination of allocation and sales. All GHGs emitted by the
entities in the program must be accompanied by the surrender of
an equal amount of allowances.
(3) The allowances can be exchanged among any parties at any
price mutually agreeable to buyers and sellers.2
The concept sounds simple enough: the government sets an emissions
limit, it allocates an allowance to emit under the limit, and those who
receive permits to emit, either through free allocations of the allowances or
their auction, can trade them, creating a “market-set” price for the right to
emit. Over time, the limit is lowered, making it more expensive to emit
GHGs. By driving up the cost of GHG emissions, the hope is that alternative, non-GHG, sources for uses like electricity and transportation will
look relatively more attractive.
Yet the cap and trade legislation is anything but simple. Its primary
vehicle, H.R. 2454, better known as “Waxman-Markey,” is 1428 pages in
length.3 The NRRI report lists numerous factors that can be taken into
consideration in designing a cap and trade program, among them:
• stringency of the cap
• breadth of coverage
• point of administration
• which GHGs are covered
• how allowances are allocated or auctioned
• allowable offsets
• whether allowances can be banked
• whether there is a price safety valve mechanism
2. Andrew Keeler, State Commission Electricity Regulation Under a Federal Greenhouse
Gas Cap-and-Trade Policy, National Regulatory Research Institute, Ohio State University, Nov.
2008, available at http://nrri.org/pubs/electricity/08-01.pdf.
3. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
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• the compliance mechanisms
• how money to be raised through the program is to be spent by
government[.]4
Each of these factors has a policy implication and a constituency. And,
in Washington, D.C., each of these has multiple lobbyists working to
represent various interests that can be harmed or benefitted depending upon
how each decision point is approached. Given the fact that the United
States, and the entire world, are overwhelmingly dependent on carbon
(GHG emitting) resources to fuel the economy, the stakes could not be
higher.5 The logrolling required to piece together a bill that attempts to
meet as many of these demands as possible is precisely how a relatively
simple concept is turned into a nearly 1500 page legislative monstrosity.6
III. UNDERSTANDING CAP AND TRADE
The key to understanding a good deal of what is driving cap and trade
is to understand that the debate has surprisingly little to do with the
environment itself or the science of anthropogenic climate change theories.
If GHG emissions reductions in the name of saving the environment were
solely the aim of legislation, reductions could be achieved through a cap.
Granted, the change would be technologically and financially difficult, to
say the least. But, if GHG emissions are a problem, the likes of which
some purport, then a declining cap is how to reduce them.
Conversely, if the proponents of legislation were merely trying to “put
a price on carbon,” as many have suggested should be done, the solution is
just as easy. A carbon tax would do that in a much more economicallyefficient manner, and without the accompanying bureaucracy to administer
a cap and trade program. It is for this reason that one prominent climate
change researcher has written, “the pseudonym ‘cap and trade’ must be
replaced by ‘tax and trade.’ One is no more a tax than the other; they both
raise the price of energy for the consumer.”7 Rather, to understand the

4. See Keeler, supra note 2, at 6-17 (discussing various factors or elements for consideration
in designing a cap and trade program).
5. See generally Energy Information Administration (EIA) Website, available at www.
eia.doe.gov (providing statistical information of energy consumption in the United States and
internationally).
6. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACESA), H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
7. See Letter from James E. Hansen, Adjunct Professor, NASA Goddard Institutes for Space
Studies at Columbia University, to Dr. Martin Parkinson, Secretary, Australian Department of
Climate Change (May 11, 2009) [hereinafter Hansen Letter], available at http://www.columbia.
edu/~jeh1/. Professor Hansen is a particularly vocal opponent of cap and trade. The letter sent to
Dr. Parkinson supports a “tax and dividend,” which is essentially a carbon tax, with a return of the
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appeal of cap and trade, one must understand the political, economic, and
technical environments more than the natural one.
The difficulty of a simple cap is the reality that pivoting from a carbonbased economy to something else is exceedingly difficult. According to the
Energy Information Administration, approximately half the electricity
produced in the United States comes from coal.8 The transportation sector
is overwhelmingly powered by fossil fuels.9 The agricultural sector is also
a large emitter of GHGs.10 To expect that these pillars of our way of life be
fundamentally overhauled in a short period of time would not just be cost
prohibitive; it would risk the very reliability of the availability of these
services. Yet, theoretically, a cap with reasonable timetables and expectations, and tied to technological advancements, could work in reducing
emissions.
The difficulty of a carbon tax is both political and economic. It has
garnered limited support in Congress for obvious reasons.11 A carbon tax
would place a price on carbon, which some advocate is an externality
whose costs should be made explicit. But it is an understatement to suggest
that a tax is politically unpopular. A tax is also an economic drag on
whatever is taxed. In the case of GHGs, because carbon fuels the bulk of
the economy, it is a far-reaching drag on the entire economy. The current
economic recession makes it an even more difficult sell than in more
ordinary times.
In contrast, cap and trade has become the primary vehicle for GHG
reductions because of what it offers those drafting the legislation. While a
hard cap would entail hard choices, the complex system of allowances,
offsets, and trading under cap and trade creates a series of constituencies the
legislation’s sponsors can weave into a bill that produces entirely new
levers of power within government and industry. Allowances can be
auctioned to raise money for government, or they can be given freely,
which creates a subsidy for the recipient. It is a subsidy for which the
revenue directly to citizens to lessen the burden of increasing energy bills. Professor Hansen has
also written extensively about the perils of cap and trade. Id.
8. Energy Information Administration Website, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
electricity/epa/epates html [hereinafter EIA Website].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Jim Efstathiou Jr. and Kim Chipman, Energy Measures May Go to Jobs Bill After
Brown Win (Update1), BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2010-01-21/energy-measures-may-go-to-jobs-bill-as-brown-win-saps-cap-trade html
(describing how the current political and economic climate has substantially decreased the
likelihood of any significant cap and trade legislation); see also Lisa Leher, GOP Warns of Harsh
Climate on Energy Bill, POLITICO, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.politico.com/news/
stories/1209/ 30886 html (describing how it will be difficult for any climate legislation to pass
prior to the 2010 mid-term elections).
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recipient will become increasingly dependent on government over time.
Yet, for every allowance given, the purported environmental benefit decreases. The creation of offsets, a sort of environmental “indulgence,”
allows entire offset industries to be created out of thin air. Speculative markets for carbon credit trading, offsets, and derivatives will be an outgrowth.
All the above will spur the need for even more government oversight,
for who will “monitor” all these issues but an entirely new class of
regulators? It is confusing and bureaucratic. But, building such constituencies is one way to shepherd legislation as sweeping as this, all in the
name of “going green.”
Similarly, while cap and trade has a very similar net effect to consumers as a carbon tax would, it is not explicitly a “tax,” so it provides
political cover. After all, what is the sense in the IRS collecting a politically unpopular tax when utility companies can do it for you shrouded
behind layers of complex regulatory accounting? Put another way, if you
are a sitting member of Congress looking to increase the cost of energy,
what is a more appealing option: having your constituents angry at you for
levying a transparent new energy tax, or having people angry at their utility
companies and state regulatory commissions because they cannot figure out
why their electricity bills keep rising each month?
IV. THE CASE AGAINST CAP AND TRADE
A. CAP AND TRADE DOES NOT ACTUALLY DO MUCH TO HELP
THE ENVIRONMENT
Some of the most pointed criticisms of cap and trade have come not
from skeptics of human-induced climate change, but from the environmental left and those who are the theory’s leading proponents.12 For example, Professor Hansen has described cap and trade as “[a] [c]ircuitous,
[i]neffectual, [i]nefficient [p]ath to a [c]arbon [p]rice.”13 Professor Hansen
goes on to dismantle the underlying promise of cap and trade—that it will
provide certainty GHG emissions will be reduced.14
Professor Hansen, who has called cap and trade the “Temple of
Doom,”15 said such certain emissions reductions are a myth.16 Specifically,
he stated that “[c]ap and trade is not robust. It has a great number of flaws,
12. See, e.g., Hansen Letter, supra note 7, at 4-7.
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. James E. Hansen, Worshipping the Temple of Doom, May 5, 2009, http://www.columbia.
edu/~jeh1/mailings/2009/20090505TempleOfDoom.pdf.
16. Id.
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which I am sure you will agree should not be ignored in our analyses.”17
According to Professor Hansen, the following is a list of some of the
problems of cap and trade:
1. Realistic caps are incomplete and do not control what
matters—total emissions.
2. Offsets are usually allowed and often poorly substantiated and
verified, creating more uncertainty.
3. As with any law, caps can and will be changed, many times,
before 2050.
4. National caps have been and are widely rejected, so the global
cap will be far too high.
5. When caps are accepted, they are often set too high—as
happened, e.g., with Russia.
6. If a complete set of tight caps were achieved, global permit
trading would likely result in a Gresham’s-Law effect—“bad
money drives out good.” Some countries will issue too many
permits or fail to enforce requirements. These permits, being
cheapest, will find their way into the world market and undermine the world cap.
7. Caps are extremely hard to enforce, as demonstrated by the
Kyoto Protocol. In some cases, even with highly respected
countries such as Canada, the extent of failure to meet commitments was enormous.
The view that we will have a “robust” cap is an illusion based on
looking at rules for an ideal cap instead of the politics of real
caps.18
Professor Hansen’s concerns are echoed by others in the environmental
movement.19 The following example describes just one of the ways that the
cap and trade plan may fall far short of meaningful emissions reductions.
Under the House climate bill, companies could pay for outside
projects that would reduce GHG emissions—a tree-planting project in Brazil, for example—in lieu of making their own cuts.
Polluters like having this option because it can often be cheaper to,
say, stop deforestation than build a new wind farm. The downside,
17. Hansen Letter, supra note 7, at 5.
18. Id.
19. Bradford Plumer, Planet Worth: Goldman Sachs Bets on Global Warming, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2009, at 7, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/environment-energy/
planet-worth.
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though, is that these projects require heavy scrutiny—you have to
make sure those newly planted trees aren’t chopped down two
years later. So the EPA has to tightly limit what offset projects get
approved. But, if Wall Street becomes heavily involved in arranging and financing offset deals, it might decide to use its lobbying
clout to increase the number of available offsets—which could
weaken oversight and let through dubious projects that don’t
actually bring emissions down.20
This example illustrates how Wall Street’s interest in maximizing
profit makes the cap and trade system less rigorous. Also, more offsets may
equal more fees charged by Wall Street.21 Some have speculated that this
scenario will create a “subprime carbon” market similar to the subprime
mortgage market.22
In explaining how these types of concerns will manifest themselves in
public opinion, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, an outspoken
proponent of reducing carbon emissions, states:
[Americans] are much less likely to support a firm in London trading offsets from an electric bill in Boston with a derivatives firm in
New York in order to help fund an aluminum smelter in Beijing,
which is what cap-and-trade is all about. People won’t support
what they can’t explain.23
These are the concerns being raised by those who are the most supportive of government stepping in to reduce GHG emissions. But legitimate
criticism of cap and trade does not stop there.
B. CAP AND TRADE PROVIDES LITTLE PRICE CERTAINTY
Some supporters of cap and trade, especially those residing within certain segments of the utility and regulatory community, argue that it has the
benefit of putting a price on carbon.24 Given the ambiguity associated with
20. Id. at 7-8.
21. Id. at 8.
22. See id. “In 2008, Credit Suisse bundled together 25 different offset projects that were at
various stages of United Nations approval, divvied them up into securities, and sold the pieces off
to investors—precisely the sort of deal that was rampant during the housing boom and set the
stage for a meltdown once homeowners started defaulting.” Id.
23. Thomas Friedman, Show Us the Ball, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 8, 2009, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/04/08 /opinion/08friedman html.
24. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners [NARUC], Resolution on
Federal Climate Legislation and Cap-and-Trade Design Principles, at 1, (Nov. 14, 2007)
available at http://www naruc.org/Resolutions/EL1%20Resolution%20on%20Federal%20Climate
%20Legislation%20and%20Cap-and-Trade%20Design%20Principles.pdf.
Despite a diversity of opinion within NARUC’s membership regarding the need for
national limitations on the emission of GHGs for the purpose of addressing concerns
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how the federal government plans to act in regards to GHG emissions, they
argue this price certainty will provide utilities and their regulatory commissions the price guidance to help them make decisions about the prudence of various resource procurement options.
While the desire for better certainty regarding future utility costs is
understandable, cap and trade may be the vehicle least suited to bringing
price stability. As previously discussed, a carbon tax would add a pricecertain to carbon. A cap without trade would also put a price on carbon by
making emissions themselves a scarce commodity. As will be summarized
in more detail later, all these approaches have an inherent flaw, but cap and
trade may be the worst of the lot. It combines the problem of expecting
governments around the world to voluntarily raise the cost of producing
energy with a speculative trading scheme that is ill suited to a worldwide
source such as carbon.
It pays to be wary of claims that carbon allowance trading will bring
certainty to the price of carbon. Any review of recent market history,
especially emerging markets such as this, will show significant price variability. Consider what has happened in recent years in natural gas markets,
where prices have swung between $2.92 and $10.82 per thousand cubic
feet.25 Within other commodity markets there have been similar price
spikes and crashes.
Potentially more concerning is that long-functioning markets have an
actual tangible product, a track record, and at least some semblance of
transparency. A world-wide carbon credit trading market offers few of
these assurances. A number of experts have expressed this view, citing the
potential for malfeasance, market speculation, and arbitrage that eventually
is charged to electricity ratepayers:
Critics of carbon-trading usually focus on this derivatives market,
which could swell to as much as $2 trillion in the program’s early
years. “There’s considerable worry that this market would have
the problems that have been found in other physical commodity
markets for the past few years,” says Michael Greenberger, a
University of Maryland law professor who oversaw the U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s trading division in the
over warming of the Earth’s climate, NARUC’s members are in general agreement
that the enactment of federal legislation limiting such emissions in would be
appropriate in order to remove existing uncertainties that are hampering the making
of transmission and generation investment decisions.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. NATURAL GAS WELLHEAD PRICE (2010), available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm.
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late 1990s. Speculators, for instance, could artificially inflate the
price of carbon—which is what some economists think happened
in the oil markets last year, when the price of crude shot up from
$60 per barrel in February 2007 to $147 per barrel in 2008. That,
in turn, could cause energy prices to skyrocket and lead to a mass
revolt against the whole idea of a carbon cap . . . . And many capand-trade skeptics fear that the House and Senate will end up letting Wall Street off easy . . . . What’s more, says Joseph Mason,
an economist at Louisiana State University and a critic of carbon
trading, it’s not always possible to legislate fraud and manipulation
out of existence. “A million traders can think of many different
ways to take advantage of these contracts that you never thought
of.”26
The price uncertainty that is created by cap and trade defeats one of its
stated goals, for if utilities and regulators observe volatile carbon markets,
they have no better basis for assessing resource selection options than they
do within the status quo.
Concerns about the speculative nature of the trade portion of cap and
trade has led to a small, but perhaps growing, number of federal policymakers calling for an alternative to cap and trade. Among them are United
States Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and Susan Collins (R-ME), who
are proposing a “cap-and-dividend” approach that would refund most of the
money raised through an emissions allowance to consumers. According to
the Associated Press:
Cantwell and Collins largely abandon the broad cap and trade approach that has been the focus in the Senate up until now, and
which has been widely attacked by Republicans and some centrist
Democrats as too complex, subject to manipulation and tantamount to imposing a huge energy tax and threatening jobs.
While the Cantwell-Collins bill would still limit greenhouse gas
emissions, it would also allow limited trading of emissions allowances. The government would auction “carbon shares”—or allowances—to fossil energy producers and importers. Three-fourths of
the revenue collected would be returned directly to consumers in
the form of monthly checks and the rest would be used to spur
clean energy and energy efficiency development and help in the
transition to “green” jobs.

26. Plumer, supra note 19, at 6.
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Allowances could be traded among the energy producers and
importers that are subject to the cap, but not other traders or
speculators.27
While the Cantwell-Collins approach would appear to mitigate many of the
speculation risks, a pure allowance auction and limited trading of allowances would still allow for a degree of uncertainty in establishing a price on
carbon due to the inherent uncertainties associated with auctions and trading
schemes. Neither is it likely that it would correct some of the economic
deficiencies that will be discussed later in this article.
C. CAP AND TRADE IS NOT WELL SUITED TO TACKLING
CARBON EMISSIONS
“Wait a minute,” supporters of cap and trade may say. “The scheme
worked well for acid rain, an argument disputed by NASA’s Hansen, so it
should work with carbon too.” Yet, even this argument fails scrutiny. A recent article details the surprising fact that the economists who invented cap
and trade see it as a flawed tool for reducing carbon emissions.28 Retired
University of Wyoming Economics Professor Thomas Crocker said, “I’m
skeptical that cap-and-trade is the most effective way to go about regulating
carbon.”29 His collaborator and fellow economist John Dales, now deceased, echoed similar comments in a 2001 interview saying, “It isn’t a cure
all for everything. There are lots of situations that don’t apply.”30
Additionally, many regulators and others involved with the utility
industry have identified the problem of drawing comparisons between the
experience of the sulfur dioxide (acid rain) cap and trade program of the
1990s and the carbon proposal of today.31 When the former program went
into effect, there was existing technology to mitigate sulfur dioxide.
27. H. Josef Hebert, Senators Propose New Approach to Climate Issue, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 11, 2009, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2009/12/11/
senatorsproposenewapproachtoclimateissue/.
28. Jon Hilsenrath, Cap-and-Trade’s Unlikely Critics: It’s Creators, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13,
2009, at A7.
29. See id. Chief among Crocker’s concerns:
[C]arbon emissions are a global problem with myriad sources. Cap-and-trade, he says,
is better suited for discrete, local pollution problems. “It is not clear to me how you
would enforce a permit system internationally,” he says. “There are no institutions
right now that have that power.”
The other problem, Mr. Crocker says, is that quantifying the economic damage of
climate change . . . is fraught with uncertainty . . . . Mr. Crocker says cap-and-trade is
better suited for problems where the damages are clear—like acid rain in the 1990sand a hard limit is needed quickly.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Therefore, utility companies had an economic choice to make in planning
for future resource additions and changes. A utility could choose to install
the equipment necessary to “clean-up” the coal, or it could use or purchase
allowances within the cap. As allowances were tightened and became more
expensive over time, the economic choice became tilted toward installing
the environmental compliance technology.
This bears no resemblance to the carbon issue. While trials and
smaller-scale projects involving carbon capture and sequestration are
promising, no commercially scalable carbon capture technology exists. In
such a world, there is no economic choice for a utility to make. The utility
either has allowances, granted or purchased, to emit carbon, or it engages in
a resource switch. Essentially, the utility chooses to generate its electricity
from some other lower carbon-intensive source, regardless of economic
cost.
The basic problem with the technical mechanics of cap and trade, as
detailed in Parts IV.A through IV.C of this article, are neatly summarized in
a quote from Yale Economics Professor William Nordhaus. In a March
2009 speech in Copenhagen, he declared:
[T]he cap-and-trade approach is a poor choice of mechanism. It is
untested in the international context; it has been unable to attain
anything close to universal participation; it loses precious fiscal
revenues; it leads to volatile prices; and it is an invitation to rentseeking. It is unlikely that the Kyoto model, even if strengthened,
can achieve its climate objectives in an efficient and effective
manner.”32
D. THE COST TO CONSUMERS AND THE ECONOMY
The cap and trade concern that has garnered the most attention in the
media is the issue of its impact on consumers and the economy. The United
States is in the midst of challenging economic times, especially within
certain energy intensive sectors like heavy manufacturing. Jobs are the
number one issue on many Americans’ minds, and anything that raises consumer costs and is a drag on job creation is sure to be a hot button issue.33

32. William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics, Yale University, Economic
Issues in a [sic] Designing a Global Agreement on Global Warming, Keynote Speech at Climate
Change: Global Risks, Challenges and Decisions, Copenhagen, Den. (Mar. 10, 2009), at 7,
available at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/documents/Copenhagen052909.pdf.
33. See, e.g., NBC NEWS/WALL STREET JOURNAL SURVEY, Study # 9500 (Jan. 10-14,
2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJNBCpoll011910.pdf
(indicating the number one issue facing Americans is jobs and the economy).
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Supporters of cap and trade have traditionally papered over questions
about job loss by shifting the discussion to “green jobs” that will be created
by the policy. While there would, no doubt, be some of these jobs created,
to suggest that cap and trade will create a net increase in jobs defies common sense. Energy costs are a major input cost for business. They are
directly related to America’s competitiveness in the global marketplace. To
the degree that these costs increase, all the businesses that pay them must
divert resources from productive endeavors to less productive ones, such as
funding a governmentally mandated energy “tax.”
For supporters of cap and trade to liken this to a job creation program is
to believe in the broken window theory of economic development.
Government could, if it wanted, pay people to smash windows. This would
“create” window jobs. Businesses would need to spend money to replace
them, and window manufacturers would need to ramp-up production and
hire new workers. But no rational person would suggest this as a jobs
program because it is only shifting dollars around; it is not a net increase in
productivity. Similarly, government could pay people to dig holes in the
middle of nowhere, but again, such programs come at a cost of taking
money away from productive uses and diverting it to less productive ones.
Furthermore, proponents of cap and trade have argued that analysis
conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicate that it would only cost an average
American family about a postage stamp a day.34 But independent review of
those studies suggests significant flaws in that reasoning. A George C.
Marshall Institute report summarized the lowball EPA-CBO cost estimates
as such:
Saying the cost of ACESA [American Clean Energy Security Act]
is just a single postage stamp a day is an appealing rhetorical flourish. But, even using the most favorable cost estimate, this rhetoric
oversimplifies the uncertainties and impacts surrounding the bill.
Advocates of Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade would be kind to

34. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Cap-and-Trade Would Slow Economy, CBO Chief Says, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
10/14/AR2009101404054 html.
Representative Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), co-author of the House bill with Representative Henry A. Waxman (D-Calif.), said that several independent analyses,
including one by the CBO, had found their bill “would only cost about a postage
stamp a day, and that’s before you include thousands of dollars in savings from
energy-efficiency gains. The harsh reality is that America’s global warming and
energy challenges are just too important for us to keep mailing it in by not enacting a
comprehensive energy and global warming bill.”
Id.

838

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:825

themselves and their credibility if they mailed the postage stamp
back to the post office.35
Common sense also dictates that cap and trade will be a proposition
that costs more than a day’s pocket change. It pays to remember that the
stated purpose of the program is to raise energy costs. To the degree it does
not, it cannot accomplish its goal. If prices do not rise enough to force
utilities to change the resources they select and consumers to change consumption patterns, the program will fail. The notion that those things can
happen for the cost of a postage stamp a day does not pass the smell test.
Rather, a number of rigorous studies support what should be self-evident. Raising energy costs in a global market, especially unilaterally, will
result in economic pain and dislocation for American workers and consumers. One such study was commissioned by the American Council for
Capital Formation and the National Association of Manufacturers (ACCFNAM). Its conclusions are a stark reminder of the impact of energy costs.36
The report demonstrates how the United States economy “slows under the
Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454), especially in the post-2020 period as the
free emission allowances are phased out for both energy producers and
energy consumers.”37 The report predicted:
In 2030, the inflation adjusted, annual GDP level is reduced by
1.8% (or $419 billion) under the low cost scenario and by 2.4% (or
$571 billion) under the high cost scenario, compared to the baseline forecast (see Table 1). To put these GDP losses in perspective, in 2008 the Federal government spent $612 billion on social
security payments to retirees. Looked at another way, if GDP
levels are reduced by $571 billion in 2030, Federal and State tax
receipts will be approximately $170 billion lower that year since
Federal and State governments take approximately 30 cents out of
every dollar of GDP. Thus, government budgets will be harder to
meet.
Over the entire 18 year period (2012-2030) covered by ACCFNAM analysis, cumulative GDP losses are substantial, ranging
from $2.2 trillion dollars under the low cost case to $3.1 trillion
under the high cost case. Again, the hit to Federal and State
35. Rachel Schwartz, Waxman-Markey Costs More Than a Postage Stamp, GEORGE C.
MARSHALL INSTITUTE POLICY OUTLOOK, Aug. 2009, at 3, available at http://www marshall.org/
pdf/materials/757.pdf.
36. See AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & NAT’L ASSOC. OF MANUFACTURERS,
ANALYSIS OF THE WAXMAN-MARKEY BILL (2009), http://www.accf.org/media/dynamic/3/
media_387.pdf [hereinafter ANALYSIS].
37. Id. at 4.
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budgets is large, cumulative tax receipts will be reduced by
between $670 billion and $930 billion compared to the baseline
forecast.38
Industrial production is found to take a particularly hard hit under the cap
and trade regime. It “begins to decline immediately in 2012, relative to the
baseline forecast, under the Waxman-Markey bill. In 2030, U.S. industrial
output levels are reduced by between 5.3% and 6.5% under the low and
high cost scenarios.”39
There is also a significant projected dampening of the employment
outlook. Regarding employment, the ACCF-NAM report found that:
Employment is negatively impacted by Waxman-Markey, even
when additional “green” jobs are factored in. Over the 2012-2030
period, total U.S. employment averages between 420,000 and
610,000 fewer jobs each year under the low and high cost scenarios than under the baseline forecast. In 2030, there are between
1,790,000 and 2,440,000 fewer jobs in the overall economy.
Manufacturing employment is hard hit: by 2030 there are between
580,000 and 740,000 fewer jobs, or between a 6 and 7% reduction
in total manufacturing employment in the U.S compared to the
baseline forecast. On average, over the 2012-2030 period, the
manufacturing sector absorbs 59 to 66% of the overall job losses
caused by the Waxman-Markey bill.40
Finally, the report concludes there is a significant negative risk for
average American consumers.41 It finds “that residential electricity prices
are 5 to 8% higher by 2020, by 2030 electricity prices are between 31 to
50% higher. Gasoline prices are also higher. By 2030 prices are up to 20
to 26% higher than under the baseline forecast.”42
The net result for household income is a decrease:
[U]nder the Waxman-Markey bill, even after accounting for rebates to consumers mandated in the bill. In 2030, the decline in
annual household income ranges from about $730 in the low cost
case to about $1,248 in the high cost case. However the impacts
on individual states, especially in the Midwest, are about twice as
high as the national average.43
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E. THE COST TO NORTH DAKOTA
Disparate regional impacts should be particularly concerning for North
Dakota policy makers. While the Midwest generally may be particularly
hard hit by cap and trade, North Dakota may be the hardest hit of all. In
April 2009, the North Dakota Public Service Commission (PSC) convened
the Carbon Cap-and-Trade Summit to discuss the consumer impact of various cap and trade proposals working their way through Congress at the
time.44 As the agency charged with setting utility rates and protecting consumers of essential services provided by state-sanctioned monopolies, the
PSC analysis focused specifically on ratepayer impacts in North Dakota—
as opposed to general economic impacts or impacts on North Dakota’s
sizable electricity production industry, which includes both fossil fuels and
renewable resources.45
In its summary report of the summit, the PSC issued a number of key
findings:
1. North Dakota is one of the most coal dependent states and its
consumers will be impacted more than those in nearly any
other state.
2. North Dakotans currently pay some of the lowest electricity
rates in the nation.
3. Energy bills are regressive in nature and higher energy costs
will harm low-income customers the most.
4. Increased energy prices will result in an overall increase in
costs of goods and services.
5. Abrupt changes in energy policy could be inefficient and cause
undue harm, both from an economic and electric reliability
standpoint.
6. Commercial scale carbon capture technology is still in its
infancy.46
Given North Dakota’s status as one of the top coal dependent states in the
nation along with its low electricity costs, the upward price risk for consumers is substantial.
That fact is borne out by the information provided to the PSC by the
state’s utility companies. While each potential impact varied, a common
44. N.D. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, CARBON CAP & TRADE SUMMIT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.psc.state nd.us/hottopics/Exec-Summary-Carbon-Capand-Trade-Summit-FinalVersion%20copy.pdf.
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id. at 2.
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trend and theme emerged from the reports. Montana-Dakota Utilities, an
investor-owned utility that provides electricity service to portions of central
and western North Dakota, reported that an additional $20 per ton cost of
carbon—$20 is often viewed as a realistic initial per ton assessment, with
costs increasing over time—would result in a 40% increase for residential
customers, and a 52% rate increase for industrial customers.47 Minnkota
Power Cooperative, a member-owned generation and transmission (G&T)
cooperative that provides service to distribution utilities throughout eastern
North Dakota and northwestern Minnesota, reported their rates would rise
25% for every $10 per ton cost assessed to carbon.48 Basin Electric Power
Cooperative, a similar G&T utility that provides service to cooperative distribution utilities throughout several states in the central and western United
States, estimates cap-and-trade could cost its consumers $498 million in
2012, with its North Dakota consumers paying $99 million of that.49 Otter
Tail Power Company, an investor-owned utility serving portions of central
and eastern North Dakota and northwest Minnesota said each $10 per ton
carbon cost would increase residential rates by 12.5% and industrial rates
by 16%.50
Perhaps the most telling fact regarding cap and trade’s specific impact
on North Dakota was a report of the National Rural Electric Cooperative
Association, which indicated that North Dakota consumers of its member
cooperatives would see the largest rate impacts of any ratepayers in the
nation, approximately $25 for every $20 per ton cost assessed.51 The PSC
itself calculated that the average annual increase for a 1000 kilowatt hour
per month user of electricity would total $350 at a low-end $20 per ton carbon “tax.” If carbon costs go up to as high as $60 per ton, not an unrealistic
assumption over time, the increase would total $1051 per year.52
In assessing the information provided at the summit, the PSC concluded with the following recommendations:
Based on the concerns and data presented at the summit, the Commission opposes cap and trade. However, the Commission would
offer the following recommendations if Congress does proceed
with a cap and trade law:

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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Revenue generated from any carbon regulation should be
targeted for carbon technology research and development,
not as an excuse for further government spending. In no
instance should cap and trade become a new general government revenue source. Doing so would ensure that
North Dakotans would pay a disproportionate share of the
cost of federal government spending.
• Any effective solution must be global. All carbon emitting
countries like China need to be involved.
• All sources of energy must be included in Cap and Trade.
Carbon regulation cannot be targeted only at electricity
ratepayers.
• Targets should be achievable and timed with technology
advancements, not based on unrealistic or arbitrary Congressional mandates.
• Reduction proposals should have safeguards so the
economy and consumers don’t suffer.
• There needs to be protections against market manipulations
and large price swings. Emission reduction proposals,
such as cap and trade, must include an economic safety
valve to avoid excessive financial hardships, market
manipulation or large price swings.
• Local distribution utilities should receive free allowances
for emissions. State regulation ensures that this will not
become a “windfall” for utility shareholders. Free allowances help mitigate the potential for skyrocketing electricity rates that are inherent in the President’s 100 percent
auction model.
The Commission does hasten to note, that even if the recommendations listed above are included in the legislation, it finds the
cap and trade concept so inherently flawed and harmful to North
Dakota consumers, that it is still a proposal that should be rejected
by Congress.53
What should be particularly disconcerting to North Dakotans is the fact
that the pain associated with cap and trade is not evenly shared by all
Americans. In fact, relative to North Dakota, some states might cynically
support it as a means for having its interests subsidized by the heartland of
53. Id. at 7-8.
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America. While an average North Dakotan might see his or her electricity
rates increase hundreds of dollars per year, someone living in a state served
primarily by nuclear or hydro power, for example, would see very little
increase. Yet most of the cap and trade plans have revenue generated from
it either spent on general fund projects or on broad-based dividend returns
to Americans generally.
Worse yet, most of the plans currently working their way through Congress call for the allocation of allowances to utilities to be based on both the
amount of carbon emitted and the actual energy sales of the utility.54 In
other words, a portion of the free allocation of allowances to utilities is
based not on how much carbon a utility has emitted, but on a utility’s retail
load.
The problem with this approach is that it means utilities that simply
happen to have low carbon resources, such as a large nuclear fleet or those
that reside in a large hydro power area, get a huge windfall of allowances
which they do not need and can then sell into the cap and trade market at a
substantial profit. It is an unearned windfall, and not coincidentally,
explains the support given cap and trade by certain large, nuclear-based
utility companies.
All of these things equate to a large tax imposed primarily on citizens
living in the heartland of the country, which is the part of the nation most
dependent on fossil based energy for its electricity. Adding to the inequality of the matter is the fact that federal law actually encouraged these
utilities to build plants in the first place. Under the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (Fuel Use Act), which was repealed in 1987, the
federal government strongly discouraged natural gas plants and encouraged
those parts of our nation that were coal-rich to build coal plants.55
In the 1970s, the utilities that were building nuclear plants and hydro
plants, or coal plants for that matter, were not doing so because of fear of
global warming, as the 1970s were the time of the Ice Age scare. Rather,
they were just following federal energy law and building the power plants
that made the most economic sense for their customers at that time. For
those in middle America to now have to shoulder not only the bulk of the
cost of switching to a lower carbon intensive electricity resource portfolio,
but also transfer their wealth to utility companies and consumers in other
parts of the nation, seems more than just a little unfair.
If North Dakotans are looking for an acknowledgement of the significant regional disparities in the burden of cap and trade, there has not yet
54. See, e.g., ACESA §§ 782(a), 783(b).
55. Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(2) (2005).
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been much sympathy given by those whose states are winners less negatively impacted by the plan. For example, United States Senator Frank
Lautenberg (D-NJ), recently described his feelings on the regional disparity
issue as follows:
[To] use a cliché around here, that says what goes around comes
around . . . .
. . . [T]here are very few states that haven’t at some time or another
been there with their hand out, with their plea for the federal
government to please come help us, move our citizens away from
flooded areas, et cetera, et cetera . . . .
. . . So we are all in this together.56
The politics of all this is, perhaps, understandable. But that alone does
not make for good public policy. It is little wonder cap and trade has been
nearly universally panned by North Dakota’s elected officials of both
parties.57
V. CONCLUSION
Readers might ask, “Well, if cap and trade is unacceptable, what are
the options?” It is a fair question. While this author claims no special
expertise in the science of global warming, it is fair to make a few observations. Much continues to be written about the nature of anthropogenic
global warming theories and the degree of actual human impact. It seems
56. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act: Hearing on S. 1733 Before the S. Comm.
on Env’t and Pub. Works, 111th Cong. 93 (2009) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg, Member,
S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works).
57. See John Hoeven, Governor, Statement of Governor John Hoeven State of North Dakota
Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works United States Senate, (July 21, 2009),
available
at
http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=
984adb4f-6b71-4e1a-a362-b7e2ae4d49cf. As of the writing of this article, no member of North
Dakota’s all-Democrat congressional delegation has announced his support for cap and trade.
Rep. Earl Pomeroy (D-ND) voted against it in the U.S. House of Representatives on June 26,
2009. Id. Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) has provided generally unfavorable reviews of the “trade”
portion of cap and trade. Id. And as noted in this article, the all-Republican North Dakota Public
Service Commission has also gone on-record as opposed to cap and trade. Id.
North Dakota’s congressional delegation is ready to oppose “cap and trade” energy
policies. That’s what the three men told participants at the annual meeting of Central
Power Electric Cooperative today. Senators Kent Conrad and Byron Dorgan and
Congressman Earl Pomeroy appeared via satellite at the meeting this afternoon. They
pledged their support for heading off plans now in congress to impose a system of
carbon limits and taxes known as cap and trade.
KXNet.com, Delegation Talks Energy, http://www kxnet.com/custom404.asp?404;http://
www.kxnet.com/t/kent-conrad/544557.asp (last visited July 1, 2010). See also Walter
Alarkon, Fast-track resolution instructions likely to be used to push tax legislation, THE HILL,
Apr. 21, 2010, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/93693-fast-track-resolution-instructionslikely-to-be-used-to-push-tax-bill (“Conrad told reporters he would oppose using the reconciliation instruction to pass a carbon emissions cap-and-trade scheme, as he did last year.”).
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as though we are still very much in the infancy of understanding global
climate models, man’s interaction with the climate, and what it all means
for the long term prosperity of mankind; to think otherwise borders on an
act of hubris.
Furthermore, climate change supporters find themselves on the defensive due to the release of e-mails that show some of the top climate
researchers in the world engaged in a long-term pattern of attempting to
undermine the scientific process.58 Peer reviewing is at the heart of this
process, and it is clear that a number of the researchers were systematically
“de-peering” scientists and academic journals that took contrary views.
This scientific debate, the proving and reproving, is the heart of good
science. Rather, there appears to be the deliberate creation of an echo
chamber, in which only those scientists predisposed to one line of thought
are considered “peers.”59 Does this alone disprove anthropogenic global
warming? No, but it, paired with red flags being raised by well-qualified
scientists, should give all serious students of the matter at least some pause
for reflection.60
Yet, setting aside these arguments over science, it would still seem
irresponsible for us to do nothing. While carbon-based resources are much,
much cleaner than ever before, they do have an environmental impact, even
beyond GHGs, that any conservation-minded person would want kept at an
acceptable minimum. In addition, it is foolhardy to suggest that the way we
produce energy today is the ultimate manner in which energy will be harnessed for all time. Rather, all of recorded history shows a march towards

58. Kim Zetter, Hacked E-mails Fuel Climate Change Debate, CNN (Nov. 26, 2009),
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/11/23/hacker.climate/index html.
59. Patrick Michaels, How to Manufacture a Climate Consensus, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18,
2009, available at http//online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870439830457459823042603
7244 html. Michaels makes the compelling argument that the undermining of refereed scientific
literature is the great scandal of what has come to be known as “Climategate.”
60. See id. Space constraints alone would prevent a listing of the names of scientists, pro and
con, with regard to the climate change debate. In any event, this article is a critique of one of the
policy proposals to reduce GHGs, rather than a debate over the science of global warming.
Suffice it to say there are qualified scientists on both sides of the matter and the Climategate
scandal itself proves there is still debate occurring within the scientific community. The position
of many scientists on the pro-side would be expressed through the work of the International Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). See IPCC Home Page, http://www.ipcc.ch/. Those with a different
viewpoint do not necessarily have an umbrella organization as such, but some examples of
scientists questioning the scope and nature of anthropogenic climate change theories are, to name
a few: Roy Spencer, PhD, Principle Research Scientist at the University of Alabama-Huntsville;
Richard S. Lindzen, Alfred P. Sloan Professor of Atmospheric Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; William Gray, Professor Emeritus, Department of Atmospheric Science, Colorado
State University; and Ian Plimer, Professor, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences,
University of Adelaide, Australia.
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more useful, higher-ordered forms of power.61 Thus, it only makes sense
for us to keep looking for newer, better, cleaner, and more cost effective
ways to produce power.
If the question truly is how to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels,
then research and development is the only answer that will effectively lower
carbon usage worldwide. No nation will ever work for long against the
economic and quality of life interests of its own citizens—not even in
Europe. Carbon will be used until it is not the economic fuel of choice.
Proponents of cap and trade, or any of the various “put a price on
carbon” plans, believe this can be “corrected” by artificially raising the
price of carbon. This is politically and economically infeasible on a worldwide basis. It is pure folly to suggest that the world will reduce carbonbased energy by hoping that each government will intentionally raise its
own cost to produce energy. Access to energy and the cost of energy are
the building blocks of every society and every economy. Individuals and
governments will not work against their own economic self interests, and to
believe otherwise is to believe a fairy tale. No legitimate government in the
history of the world has ever worked to keep its citizens poor, malnourished, and without the basic necessities of life that are afforded by the
use of energy resources.
Understanding that people work in their own self interest to provide for
their own basic needs, like food and shelter, is the key to unlocking the
GHG conundrum. Any proposal whose primary thrust is to raise energy
costs will inevitably fail. The incentives for countries to cheat or merely
avoid the system are too great to overcome, especially in the developing
world where issues of poverty are the most pervasive. The bureaucracies
needed to administer and monitor cap and trade systems for a worldwide
substance like carbon are too leviathan to bear, the risk of fraud and
manipulation too great.
Rather, the key is to make alternatives to fossil fuels so attractive that
no one would do anything but the alternative. And the important thing to
remember is cap and trade is not needed to make this happen. Only through
the funding of massive research and development will we find new ways to
harness the power needed to advance the human condition. New ways to
produce energy need to be developed. These new forms of power must be
able to successfully compete against the cost of carbon on a basis wherein
carbon’s price is not artificially inflated by governments. Only then will we
61. PETER W. HUBER & MARK P. MILLS, THE BOTTOMLESS WELL: THE TWILIGHT OF
FUEL, THE VIRTUE OF WASTE, AND WHY WE WILL NEVER RUN OUT OF ENERGY (2005)
(describing this transformation). Bill Gates said it “is the only book I’ve ever seen that really
explains energy, its history and what it will be like going forward.” Id.
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have reached a point where no nation, no regulatory commission, no utility,
and no developer would want to do anything but utilize the alternative
because it would be economic suicide to do otherwise.62
The sooner we recognize that this is the solution, the sooner we can
begin a “Manhattan-Style Project” to get there. In the meantime, we should
not waste another dime of our money or minute of our time on proposals
like cap and trade, which do little to help the environment and are a great
cost to consumers, businesses, and America’s global competitiveness. A
program that combines environmental futility with a large imposition of
costs is not forward-looking and it is not progressive. It is merely selfdestructive and should be rejected.

62. See, e.g., Bjørn Lomborg, Technology Can Fight Global Warming, WALL ST. J., Aug.
28, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020370660457437644255
9564788 html. The notion that research and development is key, paired with economic realism
about the costs and benefits of various approaches to climate change, is an argument forwarded by
a number of analysts. Id.

